Friedrich Nietzsche, The Dawn 106
03 February 2014
Against definitions of moral goals
Everywhere these days
one hears the goal of morality defined more or less as follows: it is the preserving and advancing of humanity; but this
amounts to a desire for a formula and nothing more. Preserving what?, one must immediately counter, advancing where? Hasn't precisely the essential thing, the answer to this "What?"
and "Where?" been left out of the formula? So what, then, can
it contribute to the instruction of what our duty is other than
what currently passes, tacitly and thoughtlessly, as already
established? Can one discern sufficiently from the formula
whether we ought to aim for the longest possible existence for
humanity? Or the greatest possible de-animalization of humanity? How different in each case the means, in other words,
practical morality, would have to be! Suppose one wanted to
supply humanity with the highest possible degree of rationality: this would certainly not mean vouchsafing it its greatest
possible longevity! Or suppose one thought of its "highest
happiness" as the "What" and "Where": does that mean the
greatest degree individual persons could gradually attain? Or a,
by the way, utterly incalculable, yet ultimately attained average
bliss for everyone? And why is precisely morality supposed to
be the way to get there? Hasn't morality, on the whole, opened
up such abundant sources of displeasure that one could sooner
judge that, heretofore, with every refinement in morality, human beings have grown more and more dissatisfied with themselves, their neighbor, and their lot? Hasn't the most moral
person up to now been of the belief that, in the face of morality, the only legitimate human condition is one of profoundest
misery?
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Dawn 106
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Dawn 106